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Abstract 
This paper concerns coordination of enterprise decisions such as suppliers and 
components selection, pricing and inventory in a multi-level supply chain composed of 
multiple suppliers, a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. The problem is modeled as a 
three-level dynamic non-cooperative game. Analytical and computational methods are 
developed to determine the Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, a numerical study in 
computer industry is conducted to understand the influence of the market scale parameter and 
the components selection strategy on the optimal decisions and profits of the supply chain as 
well as its constituent members. Several research findings have been obtained. 
Keywords: Multi-level supply chain, dynamic non-cooperative game, Nash equilibrium, 
product family design, pricing, inventory.  
1 Introduction 
A supply chain consists of geographically distributed and administratively decentralized 
business partners. In such a decentralized supply chain, decisions of individual partners are 
often not coordinated with each other. Their local objectives are often inconsistent with those 
of the entire system objectives. As a result, the supply chain becomes less competitive (Porter 
1985). Many firms and researchers focus on coordinating pricing and inventory decisions to 
optimize the entire system and improve the efficiency of both the supply chain and individual 
firms (Weng, 1995; Chan et al., 2004).  
Typically, a supply chain involves a variety of multiple products that are related to each 
other through common features. The levels of product variety offered by supply chains have 
demonstrated increasing trends (Macduffie et al., 1996). The product family design and 
platform products development have been widely used to increase variety, shorten lead times, 
and reduce costs (Simpson, 2005). The research in this paper has been motivated to integrate 
the product family design and platform products development into the pricing and inventory 
decisions to coordinate a decentralized supply chain.  
This paper focuses on joint decision-making about the selection of suppliers and 
components of a product family (Meyer and Utterback, 1993). The emphasis is placed upon 
the coordination of suppliers and components selection, pricing and inventory decisions 
(CSCSPI) in a multi-level supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers, one manufacturer and 
multiple retailers. The manufacturer purchases optional components of certain functionality 
from his alternative suppliers to produce a set of platform products to meet the requirements 
from the retailers in different markets. Each supplier faces the problem to make decisions on 
the prices for the components he sells to maximize his net profit. The manufacturer has to 
determine the setup time interval for production, the wholesale prices, and the suppliers and 
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components selection decisions to maximize his net profit. The retailers’ problem will focus 
on the replenishment cycles and retail prices for the products.  
We describe CSCSPI problem as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game with 
respect to the overall supply chain. The suppliers formulate the bottom-level non-cooperative 
simultaneous sub-game and at the same time as a whole play the middle-level 
non-cooperative simultaneous sub-game with the manufacturer. The suppliers and the 
manufacturer also being a group formulate the top-level non-cooperative simultaneous whole 
game with the retailers. Once the whole game settles an equilibrium solution, none of the any 
chain members is able to improve its payoff (i.e. profits) by acting unilaterally without 
degrading the performance of other players. We propose both analytical and computational 
methods to obtain the Nash equilibrium of this game.  
The game model and the proposed solution algorithm constitute a powerful decision 
support for solving the CSCSPI problem. Its use is demonstrated and tested through a 
numerical example. The impacts of the market scale parameter and components selection on 
the decisions and profits of all the chain members are also investigated. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the 
literature related to pricing and inventory coordination, product family design, Game Theory 
for supply chain coordination. In Section 3, we give the problem description and some 
notations. We formulate the mathematical model of the CSCSPI problem in Section 4. Section 
5 proposes the analytical and computational methods used to solve the CSCSPI problem in 
Section 4. In Section 6, a numerical study and the influence of market scale parameter and the 
components selection strategy have been presented. Finally, this paper concludes in Section 7 
with some limitations and suggestions for further work.  
2 Literature review 
Pricing, inventory decisions, and product family design and platform products 
development, have been extensively studied in supply chain coordination. Although the three 
areas are closely interrelated with each other, they are rarely been studied in an integrated, 
systematic manner. Recently, Game Theory (GT) has also been applied to analyze supply 
chain coordination problem. This section will briefly review a few representative works 
related to this research. 
2.1 Coordination of pricing and inventory decisions 
Coordinating pricing and inventory decisions of supply chain has been studied by 
researchers for more fifty years. Whitin (1955) shows that the retailer could obtain greater 
profits when coordinating the price and order quantity decisions. Kunreuther and Richard 
(1971) find the same results for the inter-department coordination in a manufacturer and a 
retailer. Based on their work, Tersine and Price (1981), Arcelus and Srinivasan (1987), 
Ardalan (1991), Martin (1994), and Abad (2003) draw the same conclusions in various 
circumstances. Kim and Lee (1998) examine the joint pricing and lot sizing problem for a 
profit-maximizing firm facing constant and price dependent demand with both fixed and 
variable capacity. Weng and Wong (1993) and Weng (1997) propose a model of seller-buyer 
relationship and confirm that coordinated decisions on pricing and inventory benefit both the 
individual chain members and the entire system. Boyaci and Gallego (2002) analyze the 
problem of coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment policies in a supply chain 
consisting of a wholesaler, one or more geographically dispersed retailers. They show that 
optimally coordinated policy could be implemented cooperatively by an 
inventory-consignment agreement. Prafulla et al. (2006) present a set of models of 
  
coordination for pricing and order quantity decisions in a one manufacturer and one retailer 
supply chain. They also discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various coordination 
possibilities. These studies on the coordination of pricing and inventory decisions problem 
focus on individual entities or two-stage channels.  
2.2 Product family design and platform strategy 
Thonemann and Bradley (2002) study the impact of product variety on supply chain 
performance. Kohli and Sukumar (1990) deal with a joint problem of designing a set of 
optional products to maximize the manufacturer’s profit. Various models have been derived 
for designing the product family instead of a single product to reduce the cost concerns of 
increased product variety, as Yano and Dobson (1998) reviewed. Chakravarty and Baum 
(1992) formulate a product family model incorporating process selection and use it to 
illustrate the interactions with some marketing and manufacturing variables. Saurabh and 
Krishnan (1999) examine the reduction in complexity of a product family by product design. 
Park and Simpson (2005) show the benefits of different resource sharing methods related to 
product family design. 
Meyer and Lehnerd (1997) define product platform as the shared common components, 
product structure and manufacturing assets by a product family. The advantages to design 
products based on platforms are demonstrated in component demand patterns, work center 
load, work-in-progress inventory and delivery performance (Collier, 1981). Sanderson and 
Mustafa (1995) show the impacts of using a platform strategy on the amount of product 
variety offered by a company. There are also a few model-based approaches to creating 
products based on platforms. Krishnan et al. (1998) propose a way to obtain an optimal 
platform-based family based on a network model for products that can be measured along a 
single performance index that may increase with time.  
2.3 GT for supply chain coordination 
Game Theory has been used as an alternative to study supply chain coordination problem 
as reviewed by Cachon and Netessine (2004). The quantity discount games, inventory games 
have also been studied extensively. Weng (1995) study a supply chain with one manufacturer 
and multiple identical retailers. He shows that the Stackelberg game guaranteed perfect 
coordination considering quantity discounts and franchise fees. Parlar and Wang (1994), 
address the quantity discount problem of how a supplier should design his discount pricing 
policy to maximize his profit as well as make the buyers better off using game theory 
approach. Their work is extended by Wang and Wu (2000) to the case with heterogeneous 
buyers. Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and Slikker et al. (2005) study the news vendor problem 
by Game theory approach. Moyaux et al. (2004) analyzes the informing sharing and bullwhip 
effect in a supply chain through a normal form game.  
In contract with quantity games and inventory games, GT applications to product family 
design are very limited. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) develop a game model to study the 
optimal number of suppliers for a buyer. Huang et al. (2007) optimize the configuration of a 
set of platform products and the associated supply chain using a three-move dynamic 
game-theoretic approach. 
Although GT is employed to study supply chain coordination problem in above research, 
each of them focusing on only one aspect and does not integrate quantity discount pricing 
policy, inventory decisions and product family design. Yu et al. (2006) simultaneously 
consider pricing and order intervals as decisions variables using Stackelberg game in a supply 
chain with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. Esmaeili et al. (2009) proposed several 
  
game models of seller-buyer relationship to optimize pricing and lot sizing decisions. 
Game-theoretic approaches are employed to coordinate pricing and inventory policies in these 
studies, but none of the authors involves product family design or platform product 
development in their coordination problems. Zhang (2006) integrates platform product 
development with supply chain configuration, marketing and inventory decisions using a 
dynamic game. However, her research focuses on the two-level supply chain. 
3 Problem description and some notations 
In this section, we describe the CSCSPI problem using an illustrative supply chain 
adapted from Grave and Willems (2005) and Zhang (2006) in Fig. 1. This application case is 
concerned with a three-echelon supply chain involving multiple suppliers, one single 
manufacturer and multiple retailers. The manufacturer, indicated by m , designs and 
customizes a set of platform products for retailers ( lr , 1,2,...,l L ) in different independent 
market segments. Each retailer is served by one product customized from the product 
platform. In Fig. 1, the manufacturer focuses on two computer platform products, involving 
Notebook A and Notebook B, and sells them to the retailers in two market regions 
respectively, namely Europe (EU) and North America (NA).  
The architecture for the product platform consists of a series of different functionality 
elements. Once the architecture is finalized, components are designed and selected to offer 
certain functionality. The components offering different levels of the same functionality are 
grouped together in the substitutable component set (SCS), indexed by 1,2,...,i I . Suppose 
that the components within the same SCS can be ranked in order of decreasing functionality 
and higher functionality components can substitute ones with lower functionality completely, 
but not vice versa. Thus, in this paper, components selection for the manufacturer is to decide 
whether to choose higher functionality components to replace lower ones fixed a priori and 
what higher functionality components to choose. 
Let iN  be the number of components in SCS i . ijL  is used to denoted the component 
which is the thj  element in the thi  SCS, where 1,2,...,i I  and 1,2,..., ij N . In Fig.1, 
the two platform products share the same architecture, with SCSs, processor, LCD display, 
memory, hard drive, miscellaneous components and metal housing, in sequence. Among them, 
processor and LCD display have several component options, ranked in order of decreasing 
functionality. For instance, in processor SCS, Intel Pentium Dual-core has been fixed for 
Notebook B, but the manufacturer could select higher functionality Intel Core 2Duo to replace 
it. For those SCSs, which involve one component only, we do not distinguish SCS or 
component for them. For example, for the memory SCS and memory component, we use the 
same sign to denote, as Fig. 1 shows.  
All the components are purchased from a fixed number of alternative suppliers 
( vs , 1,2,...,v V ). We assume that each supplier’s capacity is enough to satisfy the needs of 
the manufacturer. For the components in Fig. 1, there are 6 alternative suppliers. Fig. 1 also 
shows the relationship between the suppliers and the components they provided. For example, 
supplier 1 provides Intel Core 2Duo processor and SXGA+ display.  
The suppliers, the manufacturer and the retailers are assumed to be rational decision 
makers and have equal market power. An immediate question faced by each supplier is how to 
determine the prices for the components he sells to maximize his net profit. The manufacturer 
will have to determine the setup time interval for production, the wholesale prices, even the 
suppliers and components selection decisions to maximize his net profit. The retailers’ 
problem will focus on their replenishment cycles and retail prices for the products. Thus, 
  
under this supply chain circumstance, these competing non-cooperative suppliers reach an 
equilibrium on their pricing decisions and as a whole negotiate with the manufacturer on their 
pricing, inventory and suppliers and components selection decisions to maximize their own 
profits. Negotiation will also be conducted between the manufacturer and the retailers on their 
pricing and inventory decisions. After the suppliers, the manufacturer and the retailers reach 
an agreement, the manufacturer will purchase these components from the suppliers to produce 
different products for the retailers.  
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Fig. 1. Coordination of suppliers and components selection, pricing and inventory  
decisions (CSCSPI): an illustration 
 We then give some other assumptions used for building the mathematical model in the 
next section.  
(1) The integer multipliers mechanism (Moutaz, 2003) for replenishment is adopted between 
the manufacturer and the retailers. That is, the manufacturer’s setup time interval is 
integer multipliers of the replenishment cycle time of the retailers.  
(2) The suppliers and the manufacturer use vendor managed inventory (VMI) system 
(Simchi-Livi et al., 2000; Tyan and Wee, 2003) to replenish their components. This 
inventory system has been adopted by some industries for years (e.g. Wal-Mart, 
Procter&Gamble (P&G), Dell, etc.). Under this assumption, the components’ inventories 
for the manufacturer and the suppliers are at the side of their upstream suppliers and their 
corresponding inventory holding costs are also borne by their upstream suppliers 
(Birendra and Srinivasan, 2004).   
(3) Single sourcing strategy (Tullous and Utrecht, 1992) is adopted between supplies and 
manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer purchases one type of component from only one 
supplier. 
  
(4) Either all or none of the demand of a component is replaced by the lower order component 
in the same SCS. 
(5) Shortage are not permitted, hence the annual production capacity is greater than or equal 
to the total annual market demand (Esmaeili, 2008). 
4 The mathematical model  
4.1 Game scheme 
We model the CSCSPI problem as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game with 
1V L   players, i.e., V  suppliers, one manufacturer and L  retailers. Each supplier 
controls his strategy set 
vs
X  ( 1,2,...,v V ) to maximize his payoff function 
vs
 . A strategy 
v vs s
x X includes pricing decisions for the components supplied by the supplier. The 
manufacturer controls the strategy set mX  to maximize his payoff function m . His 
strategy m mx X  consists of setup time interval, profit margin for each product, and 
suppliers and components selection decisions. Each retailer controls his strategy set 
lr
X , 
whose strategy 
l lr r
x X  is composed of replenishment decisions and profit margin, to 
maximize his payoff function 
lr
 . 
In our game framework, the suppliers formulate the bottom-level non-cooperative 
simultaneous sub-game (called SS game for simplicity of reference) and at the same time as a 
group formulate the middle-level non-cooperative simultaneous sub-game (called MS game 
for reference) with the manufacturer. Also, the top-level non-cooperative simultaneous whole 
game (called RMS game for reference) is played between the suppliers and the manufacturer 
as a whole sector and all the retailers.  
According to Basar and Olsder (1982), the proposed RMS game is, therefore, a dynamic 
game where the retailers’ strategies 
lr
x  ( 1,2,...,l L ) in RMS game affect the 
manufacturer’s strategy mx  and the suppliers’ strategies vsx  ( 1,2,...,v V ) in MS game, 
and the decisions from MS game also affect those decisions in the RMS game. At the same 
time, the manufacturer’s strategies in MS game also affect the suppliers’ strategies 
vs
x  in SS 
game and vice versa. Through the dynamic interactions between RMS game, MS game and 
SS game, individual suppliers, manufacturer and retailers could determine optimal decisions 
to maximize their own payoffs. We can see this game is partially dynamic, because it is not a 
sequential game between the suppliers, the manufacturer and the retailers. Each player acts 
only once and move simultaneously (i.e. statically) in the game. That is for the suppliers, the 
manufacturer and the retailers, each of them determines their optimal decisions 
simultaneously. The whole RMS game in this paper is also a non-cooperative game with 
complete information where each player knows the other players’ strategy sets but they are 
not involved in any binding agreements. Fig. 2 shows the structure of the RMS game. 
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Fig. 2. Three-level dynamic non-cooperative game structure 
4.2 The mathematical model 
4.2.1 The retailers’ model 
We first consider the objective (payoff) function 
lr
  (l=1, 2,…L) for the retailers. The 
retailer’s objective is to maximize his net profit by optimizing his strategy 
lr
x , including 
replenishment decision and profit margin. The relevant parameters and variables of the 
retailer l are designed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Parameters and variables for retailers 
lD : Retailer l’s annual demand 
la : A constant in the demand function of retailer l, which represents his market scale 
lb : Coefficient of the product’s demand elasticity for retailer l 
lh : Retailer l’s holding cost per unit of product inventory  
lO : Ordering processing cost for retailer l per order of product l 
l : Retailer l’s annual fixed costs for the facilities and organization to carry this product 
lp : Retail price charged to the customer by retailer l 
lk : Decision variable, the integer divisor used to determine the replenishment cycle of retailer l  
lg : Decision variable, retailer l’s profit margin 
  
The demand at retailer l is almost invariably a downward sloping and convex function 
with respect to the retail price in real world. We employ the linear demand function in 
McGuire and Staelin (1983) and Jeuland and Shugan (1988):  
( )l l l l lD p a b p  ,                                                      (1) 
where la  is a constant and lb  is coefficient of the product’s demand elasticity.  
As indicated in the first point of the assumption in section 3, the integer multipliers 
mechanism is employed between the manufacturer and the retailers. Since the setup time 
interval for the manufacturer is assumed to be T, the replenishment cycle for retailer l is / lT k . 
lk  should be a positive integer. Thus, the annual holding cost is / 2l l lhTD k  (see Fig. 3(a)) 
and the ordering process cost is /l lO k T .  
The retailer l faces the holding cost, the ordering cost and an annual fixed cost. Therefore, 
the retailer l’s objective function is given by the following equation: 
  
, 2
max
l
ll
l l l
r l l l l
l
k g
TD O k
g D h
k T
                                             (2) 
Subject to 
{1, 2,3,...}lk  ,                                                     (3) 
   
ll l m
g p   ,                                                      (4) 
 l l l lD a b p  ,                                                      (5) 
0lg  ,                                                           (6) 
0 l lD P  .                                                        (7) 
   Constraint (3) gives the value of the divisor used to determine the retailer l’s 
replenishment cycle time. Constraint (4) indicates the relationship between the prices (the 
retail price lp  and the wholesale price lm ) and retailer l’s profit margin. Constraint (6) 
ensures that the value of lg  is nonnegative. Constraint (7) gives the bounds of the annual 
demand, which cannot exceed the annual production capacity lP  of the product. 
Inventory level
Time
Time
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(b) Manufacturer’ s  inventory level for product l
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Fig. 3. Inventory of retailer and manufacturer 
4.2.2 The manufacturer’s model 
The manufacturer’s objective is to determine his decision vector mx , composed of the 
setup time interval for production, the profit margins for all the products and the selection 
decision of suppliers and components, to maximize his net profit. The relevant parameters and 
  
decisions variables are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Parameters and variables for manufacturer 
lP : Annual production capacity for product l 
lm
c : Production cost per unit product l 
lm
h : Manufacturer’s holding costs per unit of product l inventory 
S : Setup cost per production 
ijF : Fixed cost of using component ijL  
ijlu : Predefined usage amount of unit component ijL  per unit product l 
v : The fixed cost of using supplier v, covering supplier certification, contract setup, etc. 
 : Annual fixed costs for the facilities and organization for the production of the products  
lm
 : Wholesale price charged to retailer l 
T : Decision variable, manufacturer’s setup time interval  
lq : Decision variable, manufacturer’s profit margin for product l 
ijk : Binary decision variable to indicate whether component ijL  has been used to replace ikL  
v : Binary decision variable to indicate whether supplier v is used 
vijt : Binary decision variable to indicate whether component ijL  is supplied by supplier v 
ijz : Binary decision variable to indicate whether component ijL  is used 
  
The manufacturer faces the costs of components used, production cost, fixed costs to 
contract with the suppliers and using components, holding costs for the products, setup cost, 
and an annual fixed cost. According to the given VMI policy, the manufacturer does not have 
to pay for the inventory cost for components. The behavior of the inventory level for the 
product for the manufacturer is illustrated as Fig. 3(b). The production time of product l is 
/l lTD P . There exists an integer ln  satisfying  / / 1 /l l l l l lnT k TD P n T k   . The 
inventories of product l from 0 to  1 /l ln T k , from  1 /l ln T k  to /l lnT k , and from 
/l lnT k  to T  are::  
     2 2 2 21, 1 12 1 / 1 /
2 2
l l l l l l l l lI P D n n T k n PT k      , 
        
2
2
2 2 2 2
2,
1
1 / 1 / 2 /
2
l
l l l l l l l l l l l
l
D
I P D n T k T n P k n D k
P
 
       
 
,  
     23, 1 1 / 1 1 /
2
l l l l l lI n k n k DT    .  
The annual inventory for product l’s is  1, 2, 3, /l l lI I I T   or given by 
 1 1/ / / 2l l l lTD k D P   through algebraic manipulations (see Lu 1995). The setup cost S  
occurs at the beginning of each production. Thus, we can easily derive the manufacturer’s 
objective (payoff) function m :  
, ,
1 1 1 1 1
, , ,
1
1
2
max
i
l
l
v vij ijl ijk
NL V I L
l
m l l v v ij ij l m
l v i j l r l
q T t z
DT S
q D F z D h
k P T 
  
    
  
          
  
  
      (8) 
Subject to   
  
1
1 1 1 1
i i
l i i i l
N NI I
l m ij ij ijl ikl ijk iN iN iN l m
i j k j i
q z u u z u c   

    
 
     
 
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1
1
k
ijk ik
j
z


  , 1,2,..., ; 1,2,..., 1; 1,...,i ii I j N k j N                     (10) 
ijk ijz  , 1,2,..., ; 1,2,..., 1; 1,...,i ii I j N k j N                          (11) 
0vijt  , ij vL Q  , 1,2,...,v V                                       (12) 
1
V
vij ij
v
t z

 , 1,2,..., ; 1, 2,..., ii I j N                                    (13) 
ij v
v vij v v
L Q
t 

   , 1,2,...,v V                                      (14) 
 , , , 0,1ij vij v ijkz t    , 1,2,..., ; 1,2,..., 1; 1,...,i ii I j N k j N                (15) 
  0lq  , 0T  .  1,2,...,l L                                          (16) 
Constraint (9) gives the relationship between the prices (the wholesale price and the 
component prices) and the manufacturer’s profit margin. The amount of components used for 
unit product l consists of two parts. If the component used for product l is not the lowest 
functionality component of a SCS, it can be used and replace any other lower functionality 
components. The usage amount of this component per unit product l is 
1
iN
ij ijl ikl ijk
k j
z u u 
 
 
 
 
 . 
Otherwise, it can only be chosen for the product and thus, its usage amount is 
i iiN iN l
z u . As 
indicated in the fourth point of the assumption in Section 3, constraint (10) ensures that a 
component is either used or replaced by certain higher functionality component, but not both. 
Constraint (11) makes sure that only procured components can be used to replace other 
components. (10) and (11) together ensure that the demands for all components are satisfied. 
Also, they met the one-way substitutability constraint which ensures that a higher 
functionality component can replace a lower functionality component but not vice versa. 
Constraint (12) sets the value of 0vijt   for all components ij vL Q  for all the suppliers. 
Constraint (13) indicates that a component is procured from exactly one supplier. Constraint 
(14) sets the value of v  to 1, if supplier v supplies a component, and ensures that if supplier 
v is selected, at least one component will be supplied by him and the number of different 
types of components supplied by supplier v is no greater than v . The value ranges of all the 
variables are set by constraints (15) and (16).  
4.2.3 The suppliers’ model 
Each supplier’s problem is to determine an optimal decision vector 
vs
x  ( 1,2,...,v V ), 
including pricing decisions for the components supplied, to maximize his net profit. Table 3 
gives the parameters and decision variables for the suppliers. 
According to the given VMI policy, the suppliers do not pay for inventory cost. The 
supplier v faces component costs and an annual fixed cost. If a component supplied by 
supplier v is not the lowest functionality component of a SCS, its usage amount per unit 
product l is 
1
iN
ij ijl ikl ijk vij
k j
z u u t
 
 
 
 
 . Otherwise, the usage amount of the component is 
i i iiN iN l viN
z u t . Therefore, the supplier v’s objective (payoff) function 
vs
  is: 
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ij v
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l i j k j
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Subject to 
0ij  ,  ij vL Q                                                    (18) 
Constraint (18) ensures the non-negativeness of 
ij . Here, we do not constraint ij  to 
be larger than its cost. That is because, the supplier may lower down the price for one 
component (even lower than its cost) to attract the manufacturer to buy his other components. 
Table 3. Parameters and variables for suppliers 
v : Number of different types of components supplier v is capable of supplying 
ijc : The cost of component ijL  paid by supplier 
vQ : Set of components supplied by supplier v 
v : Supplier v’s annual fixed costs for the facilities and organization to carry the components 
ij : Decision variable, the price of component ijL  charged by the supplier to the manufacturer 
  
5 Model analysis and solution algorithm  
Nash equilibrium is the most popular non-cooperative solution concept in game theory, 
which is widely used for dynamic non-cooperative game (Basar and Olsder, 1982). To obtain 
the Nash equilibrium, each player of the game takes the other players’ decisions as given 
input parameters to determine his own decisions and adjusts his decisions corresponding to 
the changing of the other players’ decisions to maximize his profit. The process continues 
until no player is willing to change his decisions, because any unilaterally changing will bring 
loss to him and then the Nash equilibrium is achieved.  
In this paper, we apply Nash equilibrium concept to analyze the strategies of the supplier, 
the manufacturer and the retailers in the whole RMS game. Based on the analytical theory of 
Liu (1998), we first calculate the best reaction functions of each player and then employ 
algorithm procedure to build the Nash equilibrium. 
5.1 Reaction functions 
5.1.1 The retailers’ reactions 
We express retailer l’s demand function by the corresponding profit margins. Substituting 
(2) and (9), we can rewrite (5) as: 
1
1 1 1 1
i i
i i i l
N NI I
l l l l l ij ij ijl ikl ijk iN iN iN l m
i j k j i
D a b g q z u u z u c  
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  
   .        (19) 
Now suppose that the decision variables for the suppliers and the manufacturer are fixed. 
Then the retailer l’s problem of finding the optimal replenishment cycle becomes: 
 min
2l
l l l
l l
k
l
TD k O
U h
k T
  .                                               (20) 
The best reaction lk  that minimize lU  is by the smallest integer 
*
lk  that satisfies 
(Rosenblatt and Lee, 1985; Viswanathan and Wang, 2003): 
  
        
2
* * * *1 1
2
l l
l l l l
l
T h D
k k k k
O
       or                                   (21) 
2
* 21 1 / 2l ll
l
T h D
k
O
  
    
    
.                                          (22) 
Here, we define a    as the largest integer no larger than a. 
We then consider the optimal value of lg . From constraints (6) and (7), we can obtain 
lower bound and the upper bound of lg : 
1
1 1 1 1
max 0,
i i
i i i l
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l l
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Substituted (19) into (2), we can see that 
lr
  is a quadratic function of lg . Because the 
second derivative of 
lr
  with respect to lg  is negative, we have: 
2
2
2 0l
r
l
l
b
g
 
  

.                                                    (25) 
Thus, 
lr
  is a concave function of lg .  
Set the first derivative of 
lr
  with respect to lg  equal to zero. Then lg  can be 
obtained as: 
2 4
l l
l
l l
C hT
g
b k
  ,                                                      (26) 
where 
1
1 1 1 1
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If lg  obtained from (26) is in the interval of ,l lg g   , it is obviously the optimal 
reaction *
lg  of the retailer. Otherwise, we have to substitute the bounds (23) and (24) into (2), 
the bound that provides higher profit is the best reaction *
lg . 
5.1.2 The manufacturer’s reactions 
Assume that the decision variables for the suppliers and the retailers are fixed. The 
manufacturer’s problem of finding the optimal setup time interval in this case becomes: 
1
1
min 1
2 l
L
l
m l m
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l l l
DT S
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k P T
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 .                                 (27) 
Since the second derivative of (27), 2 2/ 2 / 0mU T S T    , the optimal T for the 
minimum of mU  can be derived from:  
2
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Obviously, the optimal *T  obtained from (29) satisfies constraint (16). 
The net profit m  is the quadratic function of lq . From constraints (7) and (16), we can 
obtain lower and the upper bounds of lq : 
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m ’s second derivative about lq  is  
22
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If 2 2/ 0m lq    , the optimal lq  can be obtained from the first order condition of m : 
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Substitute (19) into (33), we have: 
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where 
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If lq  obtained from (34) is in the interval of ,l lq q   , it is the optimal reaction 
*
lq  of 
the manufacturer. Otherwise, m  reaches its maximal value when lq  is at its upper bound 
or lower bound. The bound that provides higher profit is the optimal reaction *
lq . 
If 2 2/ 0m lq    , we also have to find the bound that provides maximal value of m . 
That is the best reaction *
lq . 
Substitute (19) into the manufacturer’s objective function (8), then the manufacturer’s 
problem to find out optimal suppliers and components to maximize his profit is 0-1 integer 
programming with objection function (8) and Constraints (10)-(15). Some optimization 
software, such as Lingo, etc., can be used to solve this programming to obtain the best 
reactions 
*
ijk , 
*
v , 
*
vijt , and 
*
ijz .  
5.1.3 The suppliers’ reactions 
Lastly, we consider the reaction functions for the suppliers. Suppose that the decision 
variables for the retailers and the manufacturer are fixed. The supplier’s problem is to find out 
the optimal reaction for prices for the components his supplies. The second order condition 
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Obviously, 2 2/ 0
vs mn
    . 
Thus, the necessary condition to maximize the supplier’s net profit 
vs
  is: 
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Substitute (19) into (36), we can obtain: 
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   From constraints (7) and (18), we can obtain the upper bound and lower bound of 
mn : 
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If mn  obtained from (37) is in the interval of ,mn mn    , it is the best reaction 
*
mn  of 
supplier v. Otherwise, we have to substitute the bounds (38) and (39) into (12), the bound that 
provides higher profit is the optimal reaction *
mn . 
5.2 Algorithm for the Nash equilibrium of RMS game 
In this sub-section, we give the following solution algorithm to compute the equilibrium 
of the three-level dynamic non-cooperative game. As Section 4.1, 
w
X   is denoted as the 
strategy set of the supply chain member w ,  1 1,..., , , ,...,w V Ls s m r r  . 1 ... WX X X      
is the strategy profile set of supply chain members 1  to W . Thus, sX , rX , smX  and X  
are the strategy profile sets of all the suppliers, all the retailers, the suppliers and the 
manufacturer, and all the chain members, respectively. x  is the strategy / strategy profile of 
strategy set / strategy profile set X  . Let x   be the strategy profile of all the supply chain 
members except for  . We present the following algorithm for solving the three-level 
dynamic non-cooperative game model:  
Step 0: Give the initial strategy profile for all suppliers, the manufacturer and all retailers 
  (0) (0) (0) (0), ,s m rx x x x  in the strategy profile set X .  
Step 1: For each retailer l, based on 
(0)
lr
x , the optimal reaction  * * *,lr l lx k g  is obtained as 
Section 5.1.1 in strategy set 
lr
X . 
Step 2: Fixed (0)
mx , based on 
(0)
mx , find out the optimal reaction 
 * * * * * * *, , , , ,m l ijk v vij ijx T q t z   as Section 5.1.2 in strategy set mX . 
Step 3: For each supplier v, based on 
(0)
vs
x , find out the optimal reaction  * * ,vs mnx   for 
all mn vL Q , as Section 5.1.3. If 
* (0)
1s sx x  
①
, the Nash equilibrium of SS game, *
sx , 
obtained, Go step 4.  
Step 4:  * * *,sm s mx x x . If * (0) 2sm smx x   ①, the Nash equilibrium of MS game, *msx , 
obtained, Go step 5.  
Step 5:  * * *,sm rx x x . If * (0) 3x x   ①, the Nash equilibrium of RMS game, *x , obtained. 
  
Output the optimal results and stop. Otherwise, (0) *x x , go step 1. 
 (①: 1 , 2 , 3  are very small positive numbers) 
6 Numerical results 
To demonstrate the application of the proposed game model and solution algorithm, we 
present and discuss a specific case in a computer industry. This particular case is concerned 
with coordinating suppliers and components selection, pricing and replenishment decisions of 
the supply chain (as Fig. 1) described in Section 3. The explicit numerical parameters selected 
for the base case example reflect those shown in Lu (1995), Woo et al. (2001), Prafulla et al. 
(2006). For example, the holding cost per unit final product at any retailer should be higher 
than the manufacturer’s. The manufacturer’s setup cost should be much larger than any 
ordering cost. All the parameters are given in Table 5 and the relationship between the 
components and their suppliers is shown as Fig. 1.  
To investigate the influence of varying parameter and integrating product family design, 
we conduct sensitive analysis on market scale parameter and for different values of market 
scale and consider two cases, i.e. no components selection (NCS) case and with components 
selection (WCS) case. For the first one, components used for each product have already been 
fixed a priori. No substitution could be conducted. For the second one, although components 
used for each product have been fixed, higher functionality components can be used to 
substitute lower ones. By applying the solution procedure in section 5.2, the optimal decisions 
and profits for the suppliers, the manufacturer and the retailers are summarized in Table 4 and 
Table 5.  
6.1 Simulation results 
Table 4 illustrates the optimal suppliers and components selection, the components pricing 
decisions and profits for NCS case (Table 4(a)) and WCS case (Table 4(b)) under different 
values of market scale.  
As can be seen, when 1a  is 
62.0 10 , the same suppliers and components are selected 
for NCS case and WCS case. However, we observe from Table 4(b) that when 1a  increases 
to 62.5 10 , component 23L  is substituted by 22L  for product 2. Moreover, when 1a  is 
65.0 10 , the highest functionality components 11L  and 21L  are used to substitute lower 
functionality components 12L  and 22L  for both products. On this occasion, supplier 2 and 
supplier 3 are not selected, while supplier 4 is selected. This shows that in WCS case, less 
suppliers are selected and higher functionality components are used to replace lower ones as 
1a  increases. 
Table 4 also exhibits that higher values of 1a  increase the total profit of the suppliers in 
both NCS case and WCS case. Yet, the total profit of the suppliers in NCS case is higher than 
WCS case and the profit disparity between NCS case and WCS case is increasing in 1a . For 
example, when 1a  is 
62.5 10 , the suppliers’ total profit in NCS case ( 83.9867 10 ) is only 
7.27% greater than that in WCS case ( 83.7166 10 ). However, when 1a  increases to 
65.0 10 , the profit gap is widen to 64.83%. And supplier 1s , who provides components that 
only used for product 1, has a most profit increase. In the above case, when 1a  increases to 
62.5 10 , 1s ’s profit increases from 1.9729 to 4.5474, by 130.49%, while the other suppliers’ 
  
profit increases are no more than 38.32%.  
The optimal decisions and profits of the manufacturer and the retailers for both NCS case 
and WCS case by varying the market scale parameter 1a  are illustrated in Table 5. It can be 
seen that both the wholesale prices and the retail prices for the two products are increasing in 
1a  and product 1’s prices increase more significantly. We also find that as 1a  increases, the 
manufacturer’s profit, retailer 1’s profit and the total profits of the supply chain members (i.e. 
system profit) improve, whereas retailer 2’s profit decreases.  
Comparing the two cases, we can see that the wholesale price and the retail price for 
product 1 are lower in WCS case, while the prices for product 2 are higher. In contrast, in 
WCS case, the profits for the manufacturer and retailer 1 are higher, and retailer 2’s profit and 
the system profit are lower. Moreover, considering when 1a  increases from 
62.0 10  to 
63.5 10 , the manufacturer’s profit and retailer 1’s profit in WCS case are 17.32% and 4.84% 
larger than the profits in NCS case. When 1a  increases to 
65.0 10 , the profit gaps are 
widen to 66.95% and 13.78%, respectively. That is the manufacturer and retailer 1 benefit 
more in WCS case as 1a  increases. However, Table 5 also shows that the system profit 
increases more significantly in NCS case and for retailer 2’s, its profit decreases more 
significantly in WCS case. 
From Table 5, we also observe that a larger value of 1a  shortens the setup time interval 
for retailer 1 and retailer 1 will replenish his product more frequently in WCS case than in 
NCS case. Observed from NCS case, when 1a  increases from 
63.5 10  to 65.0 10 , the 
cycles for retailer 1 reduce from 0.0356/12 to 0.0332/14. And the replenishment cycles of 
retailer 1 in WCS case are 0.0358/13, 0.1195/52, which are shorter than 0.0356/12, 0.0332/14 
in NCS case. 
6.2 Managerial implications 
Based on the results obtained from the simulation results presented above, in this 
subsection, we wrap up our findings and provide some important managerial insights. 
The first finding is that an increase in one retailer’s market scale would increase this 
retailer’s and the manufacturer’s profits, as well as the suppliers’ total profit and the system 
profit, while decreasing the other retailer’s profit. Specially, such benefit for the suppliers 
mostly goes to the suppliers who only provide components for the product in this market. 
When one retailer’s market scale increases, the manufacturer would rather provide more 
product to this retailer and cut the production for other product to achieve higher profit. The 
increased demand for this product brings larger profits for the supply chain system and the 
corresponding components suppliers. 
Secondly, in the presence of the component selection strategy, when one retailer’s market 
scale is large, the manufacturer tends to use higher functionality components for the product 
in this market. Consequently, the manufacturer could benefit from the component selection 
strategy, and the supply chain system includes fewer components and less suppliers and their 
total profit becomes lower. However, when the market scale is low, the manufacturer would 
build up the product exactly the same as the retailer requires. 
It is also worth mentioning that as one retailer’s market scale increases, the manufacturer 
and this retailer could benefit more from the components selection strategy. In the contrary, 
the suppliers as a group, the other retailer and the supply chain system benefit more with the 
absence of this strategy. That is, in NCS case, the total profit of the suppliers and the system 
profit increase more significantly. The profits for the manufacturer and this retailer increase 
more significantly and the other retailer’s profit decreases more significantly in WCS case. 
  
Finally, when one retailer’s market scale is large, the components selection strategy would 
increase this retailer’s order frequency. The components selection strategy would enhance the 
demand for this retailer. Thus, a shorter replenishment cycle is required.  
  
 Table 4. Decisions and profits of the suppliers 
(a)NCS case 
s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6  
L11 L21 
 L12 L23 L61 
 L22 L41 
 L31 L41 
 L51 
 L31 L61 
Total profit 
Price 138.47   137.93 88.46   129.47 68.46     261.29  85.52 15.76  2.0× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 1.9729  6.6354  6.6349  0  6.3930  6.3924 28.0286 
Price 168.98   131.16 118.97   92.21 98.96     274.59  114.59 4.59× 10-13  2.5× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 4.5474  8.8178  8.8173  0  8.8424  8.8418 39.8667 
Price 229.96   117.67 179.96   17.74 159.94     301.20  141.20 7.78× 10-13  3.5× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 12.372  15.878  15.877  0  14.878  14.877 73.882 
Price 333.10   81.54 283.09   0 206.99     340.06  180.06 3.97× 10-13  5.0× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 32.614  34.179  29.578  0  26.550  26.549 149.47 
(b) WCS case 
s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6  
L11 L21 
 L12 L23 L61 
 L22 L41 
 L31 L41 
 L51 
 L31 L61 
Total profit 
Price 138.47   137.93 88.46   129.47 68.46     261.29  85.52 15.76  2.0× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 1.9729  6.6354  6.6349  0  6.3930  6.3924 28.0286 
Price 176.63   129.82    93.66 94.44     278.09  75.13 42.96  2.5× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 5.0930  4.1937  9.2937  0  9.2931  8.8418 37.1659 
Price 264.10   97.28    71.81 148.37     310.17  52.63 97.53  3.5× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 16.014  2.3916  16.325  0  16.325  14.877 67.3796 
Price 207.91 213.26          155.17  321.17  75.13 83.32  5.0× 10
6
 
Profit (× 107) 22.671  0  0  22.671  22.671  22.671 90.685 
         
implies the component is not selected for the platform products 
Results 
Supplier & Supplied 
 components 
1a
Results 
Supplier & Supplied 
 components 
1a
 
 
  
 Table 5. Decisions and profits of the manufacturer and the retailers 
 NCS case  WCS case 
m  m 
 Manufacturer & 
Retailer 
Product 1 Product 2 
r1 r2  
Product 1 Product 2 
r1 r2 
Price 695.83 782.92 1,062.20 1,224.80  695.83 782.92 1,062.20 1,224.80 
Cycle 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411/10 0.0411/17  0.0411 0.0411 0.0411/10 0.0411/17 
Demand(× 105)  5.1291 5.3025 5.1291 5.3025  5.1291 5.3025 5.1291 5.3025 
2.0× 10
6
 
Profit(× 107)  5.6451 18.791 23.430  5.6451 18.791 23.430 
 System profit(× 108)  7.5895  7.5895 
Price 843.90 789.68 1,314.80 1,228.20  836.24 791.03 1,311.00 1,228.80 
Cycle 0.0389 0.0389 0.0389/11 0.0389/16  0.0384 0.0384 0.0384/11 0.0384/16 
Demand(× 105)  6.5927 5.2619 6.5927 5.2619  6.6463 5.2538 6.6463 5.2538 
2.5× 10
6
 
Profit(× 107)  7.6617 31.045 23.073  8.1211 31.552 23.002 
 System profit(× 108)  10.1646  9.9841 
Price 1,140.10 803.17 1,820.0 1,234.90  1,105.90 823.57 1,803.00 1,245.10 
Cycle 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356/12 0.0356/15  0.0358 0.0358 0.0358/13 0.0358/15 
Demand(× 105)  9.5196 5.1810 9.5196 5.1810  9.7586 5.0586 9.7586 5.0586 
3.5× 10
6
 
Profit(× 107)  14.342 64.731 22.369  16.826 68.021 21.324 
 System profit(× 108)  17.5324  17.3551 
Price 1,572.60 839.31 2,572.00 1,253.00  1,418.80 1,059.70 2,495.10 1,363.20 
Cycle 0.0332 0.0332 0.0332/14 0.0332/14  0.1195 0.1195 0.1195/52 0.1195/42 
Demand(× 105)  13.992 4.9642 13.992 4.9642  15.068 3.6419 15.068 3.6419 
5.0× 10
6
 
Profit(× 107)  31.961 139.83 20.536  53.360 162.18 11.053 
 System profit(× 108)  34.1797  31.7278 
Results 
1a
Parameters for base example:
6
1 2 2 10a a   ; 1 1400b  , 2 1200b  ; 1 4O  , 2 3O  ; 1 1h  , 2 2h  , 100S  , 1 0.5mh  , 2 1mh  , 
6
1 5 10P   , 
6
2 3 10P   , 1 10mc  , 2 5mc  , 1 12  , 2 13  , 3 40  , 4 60  , 5 18  , 6 31  , 11 3F  , 12 4F  , 21 6F  , 
22 7F  , 23 8F  , 31 9F  , 41 12F  , 51 2F  , 61 10F  , 11 100Lc  , 12 50Lc  , 21 200Lc  , 22 80Lc  , 23 50Lc  , 31 20Lc  , 41 30Lc  , 
51
200Lc  , 61 29Lc  , 1 30sR  , 2 15sR  , 3 35sR  , 4 23sR  , 5 20sR  , 6 18sR  , 100mR  , 1 50rR  , 2 61rR  . 
  
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have considered the coordination of suppliers and components selection, 
pricing, and replenishment decisions in a multi-level supply chain composed of multiple 
suppliers, one single manufacturer and multiple retailers. This coordination problem is 
modeled as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game model. We use both analytical and 
computational methods for the derivative of the optimal decisions of all the chain members. A 
numerical study is conducted to examine the game model and solution algorithm. The 
numerical results show that the increase of one retailer’s market scale will decrease the other 
retailer’s profit and shorten his own replenishment cycle. Moreover, when one retailer’s 
market scale is large and a components selection strategy is simultaneously employed, the 
manufacturer tends to use high-end components to substitute the low-end ones for the product 
sold to this retailer and the manufacturer would generally benefit from this strategy. However, 
the supply chain system may become leaner with a fewer number of components and 
suppliers and their total profit would be lower. Individually, some suppliers may also benefit 
from this components selection strategy while others may suffer from a loss in profits. 
The contributions of the paper to the literature are as follows. Most literature to date have 
focused on pricing and inventory coordination in the two-echelon channel. This paper is an 
important addition to the literature on coordinating pricing and inventory decisions in a 
multi-level supply chain. Furthermore, this paper incorporates product family design with 
pricing and inventory coordination problem. In such a situation, products can be built more 
flexibly with the market. Lastly, significantly different from most extant literature in supply 
chain coordination which regard suppliers and components are selected already, we consider 
supplier selection and component selection as decision variables and determine them through 
a whole supply chain dynamic game.  
This paper has several limitations which can be extended in the further research. The 
competition among multiple products and among multiple retailers is not covered in this paper. 
Under this competition, the demand of one product / retailer is not only the function of his 
own price, but also the other products’ / retailers’ prices. Secondly, we assume that the 
components can be ranked in the order of decreasing functionality, and either all or none the 
demand of a component is replaced by the lower order component in the same SCS. Future 
research should relax these constraints and include the case that the components can be 
partially replaced by higher functionality components. Also, we assume that the production 
rate is greater than or equal to the demand rate to avoid shortage cost. Without this 
assumption, the extra cost should be incorporated into the future work.  
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